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Gender and Status Inequalities in Yemen:
Honour, Economics, and Politics
Sheila Carapico

INTRODUCTION

Studies of women in Arab countries fit into two other wider inquiries.
Within the anthropology of the Middle East, as Abu Lughod shows in her
review, 'harem theory' is one of the three 'theoretical metonyms', the
other two being segmentation theory and Islam. Because ethnographic
debates on segmentation among tribes and orientalist studies of Islam are
largely male dominated, and Western stereotypes of Arab women are so
sexist, studies of women initially strove merely to show elements of power
and individualism within the 'harem' and have only more recently moved
on to analyse the ideologies of patriarchy and sexual modesty, the epistemological issues involved in 'knowing the Other', and the relationship between
studies of women and studies of men (Abu-Lughod, 1990).
Arab women are also included under the broader rubric of womenin-development (WID), where general questions concern the impact of
modernization on women's lives and the specific questions asked about
the Middle East have often been whether Islamic or Arab culture is inimical to women's liberation. In this literature, as Moghadam shows, more
recent research considers how male-dominated patriarchal structures in
the public and private spheres of tribal societies and 'neo-patriarchal'
states restrict female access to the public domain. She de~ls with the
impact of wealth, status, power, and public policy on gender relations. It
is also important in this context to examine changes in personal status,
political rights, education and health, and employment (Moghadam, 1990,
1992).
The aim of this national case study, a synthetic summary of the work
and evidence on women in a tribal, Muslim, Arabian, rapidly changing
society, is to contribute to the intersection of the Middle Eastern and
women-in-development literatures by situating women first within tribal
and Islamic settings and then in the context of rapid changes in political
and economic circumstances during the past thirty years. It therefore
considers feminine roles in the different historical social strata before
examining how new services brought by modernization, class formation
associated with the penetration of capitalism, and political struggles between
right and left all affect women's positions in modernizing Arab societies.
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What I hope to show is that the relationship between modernization and
women's status is not a straightforward one, even in an apparently patriarchal Arab context.

TRIBES, ELITES, AND SERVICE PEOPLE

A mountainous, semi-arid farming region on the south-west Arabian
peninsula, historic Yemen was partitioned in the nineteenth century when
the British colonized the area around and later east of the important
natural harbour at Aden, while the north remained in the Ottoman sphere
of influence until World War I and independent under a Zaydi imam
afterwards. Within North Yemen, there are three major geo-cultural regions: the northern highlands, a semi-arid zone characterized by grain
production and sheep and goat herding; the southern uplands, washed
twice annually by Indian Ocean monsoons, greener and supporting a
peasant population; and the Tihama, the Red Sea coastal plain, with
tropical agriculture in the mountain-fed wadis and near-desert conditions
in between. In the South, colonial capitalism and post-revolutionary socialism affected Aden city and the nearby Lahej agricultural region most
directly, whereas the irrigated Wadi Hadramawt and the more tribal eastern mountains remained quite isolated. The northern highlands are predominantly Zaydi (Shi'a) whereas the rest of Yemen is mostly Shafa'i
(Sunni).
The ethnographic literature, most of which (with the exception ofBujra)
comes from the north in the late 1970s and early 1980s, describes a
tripartite status hierarchy consisting of the tribes (qaba'il), the elite or
religious aristocracy (sa'ada), and the 'deficient' or 'service' groups at the
bottom of the social ladder. The three groups' status and roles were
interdependent. While the. tribespeople engaged in grain farming and/or
herding, and the educated elite practised the legal, administrative, and
educational professions, the lower-status groups performed personal and
market services on a contractual or, more recently, a commercial basis.
Like ascribed status categories in most cultures, membership in each group
was based on descent or at least a myth of common ancestry, maintained
through endogamous marriage patterns (Bujra, 1971; Caton, 1990; Dresch,
1977).
'Tribe' has two distinct connotations. In political histories, 'the tribes'
are the great Hashid and Bakil confederations of the northern plateau,
who maintained through a combination of honour and force a 'tribal
peace' that protected unarmed people including religious elites, service
people, and women. Tribalism in this sense embodies a set of folk codes
of behaviour ( 'urf or 'ard) and a form of political organization under the
leadership of quasi-elected shaykhs. In the second connotation 'tribesman'
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(qabili) or 'tribeswoman' (qabiliyya) means tribal, as distinct from nontribal, status. Beyond Hashid and Bakil territory, 'tribes' are less of a
political force, farmers are often called 'peasant' (ra'iyya) as opposed to
qabili, tribal codes are relaxed, and the term shaykh connotes exploitation
more than election. However, tribespeople are distinguished from both
higher- and lower-status groups, as 'independent' cereal farmers and/or
herders.
Independent cereal and dairy production was not pure subsistence, for
tribal households relied on others to provide the goods and services their
'honour' prevented them from undertaking, including growing vegetables,
especially local onions and horse-radishes; and the activities of barbers,
builders, cosmeticians, healers, criers, musicians, artisans, builders, traders, innkeepers, and, particularly, street-sweepers and bath-cleaners. Dishonoured by these tasks, tribal communities or families contracted with
market people or ritual specialists, exchanging grain, butter, and meat for
services. Service professionals, referred to collectively as muzayyin, as
'deficient' (nuqqas), or as 'market people' (ahl al-suq), traditionally entered
contractual agreements to provide certain goods and services in exchange
for grain and protection from a tribe, or subsistence from an elite community. Group-to-group contractual arrangements were preferred by both
farmers and Muslim and Jewish service people for their reliability and
dignity.
The elite non-tribal religious aristocracy consisted of the descendants of
the Prophet, the Sa'ada and/or Ashraf (singular sayyid or sharif); and the
judges (singular qadi) whose status came not from birth (for by blood they
were tribesmen) but from education which, as in Europe, tended to be
passed on within families. Honour attached to piety, scholarship, and
mediation of disputes rather than, as among tribesmen, to acts of valour
and violence (Caton, 1986). These two groups tended to concentrate in
a dozen or more historic towns, where a combination of fees for legal
services, rent-taking, religious endowment, and royal largess gave them a
standard of living somewhat, but not dramatically, better than that of
either rural tribesfolk or the service people in their midst. Under tribal
practice, sayyid communities, like the market domain, were hijrah or
'protected' from warfare.
At the very bottom of the social hierarchy were the Akhdam (servants),
employed in urban and market areas as street-weepers and bath-cleaners
for the municipalities or awqaj, where taxes or endowments paid their
wages, or on large estates in the Tihama and some parts of the southern
uplands as migrant harvest workers, a step below the permanent sharecroppers. Often seen lodged in temporary housing on the edge of towns,
markets, and estates, the Akhdam are very nearly a distinct ethnic group,
who evidently have African as well as Arab heritage, dress distinctively,
and rarely interact socially with other Yemenis. Although when camped
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they appeared to be propertyless, a careful study in 1977 of Luhayyah
district in the near-desert northern Tihama showed that families abandoned their land in drought years to seek employment as migrant farm
workers, urban sanitation workers, or unskilled labourers in Saudi Arabia
(Steffen et al., 1978).
The distinctions among these groups were status inequalities rather
than class divisions because independent farmers and tradespeople owned
their own means of production-land, livestock, and the tools of their
trades-and engaged in contractual exchange with other groups. Moreover, it was not the religious elite but a distinct tribute-collecting class-inthe-making that expropriated wealth through a sharecropping system not
corresponding directly to status (Tutwiler, 1987). Unlike inter-household
sharecropping in the semi-arid zones, on some irrigated estates in the
southern uplands, the Tihama, and the Hadramawt, sharecroppers paid up
to three-quarters of their crop to landlord-shaykhs or urban masters. Among
the largest landowners in the early twentieth century were the imam's
family and some other prominent sayyid families, but also northern shaykhs
who conquered verdant valleys and traders who took land as collateral
against loans. Independent farmers then became sharecroppers and gradually lost their tribal identity along with their independence. Class and
status overlapped most closely for the Akhdam; otherwise, the class relation between owners and sharecroppers should not be confused with the
status distinctions in the ethnographic literature.
Nor did low status prevent some coffee merchants, importers, and
businessmen who moved to British Aden from amassing economic and
political fortunes (Messick, 1978). The imams also selected some bright
sons of low-status families for higher education or military posts precisely
because, unlike either tribal military leaders or other descendants of the
prophet, they could presumably broker no claim to political power. Thus
although the monarchy derived its ideology and legitimacy from the religious
aristocracy, status did not coincide exactly with wealth and power. When
the son of a blacksmith, in his capacity as captain of the palace guard,
seized the reins of state in September 1962, the sa'ada lost influence, but
merchants and officers were posed to come to the fore.

THE ROLES OF WOMEN

Gender, the second major source of inequality in Yemeni society, has
been the subject of more journalistic and impressionistic writing than
serious scholarship. The major published studies of Yemeni women remain Myntti's general overview and Dorsky's study of Amran, while the
bulk of the analysis of extended fieldwork by Najwa Adra, Christine Ansell,
Mary Herbert, Martha Mundy, and Delores Walters remains unpublished.
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Evidence suggests a great deal of regional and situational variation, within
which, ironically from a contemporary liberal feminist political perspective, the greatest honour is attached to feminine seclusion and the greatest
shame to market activity. This section begins with the role of women
farmers and sharecroppers, and then considers sayyid, service, and Akhdam
women.
The predominant farm system consisted of three interdependent elements: the fields, the livestock, and the kitchen. The fields supplied cereal
and tinder to the kitchen and fodder for the livestock, who, in tum,
returned fertilizer and traction to the fields as well as milk and sometimes
meat to the kitchen. This was a use-value-maximizing system with virtually no waste, since grasses and stalks were culled for feed and fuel,
leftovers fattened livestock, and even droppings were used as fuel or to
replenish the soil. The farm system produced a nutritious, high-fibre diet
of grain, beans, dairy products like buttermilk and clarified butter, sometimes eggs or meat, and herbs and seasonal fruits. Water had to be collected daily, often from natural streams.
Within the tribal household, men performed the mainly seasonal tasks
associated with the land and women did nearly everything else. Men
maintained the terraces contouring the rugged highlands, or irrigation
systems in the Tihama, rebuilding walls, ploughing, levelling fields, and
turning the soil under after harvest, using drought stock. Women's responsibilities for dairy stock and the kitchen entailed a long list of daily
chores, including cutting fodder and collecting fuel, feeding and milking,
preparing a fire, grinding grain, making bread or porridge, collecting water,
and, of course, serving meals and raising children (Dorsky, 1986; Myntti,
1979; Carapico and Tutwiler, 1981).
Women's work was not 'housework'; it was the basis of production and
subsistence, with high value added. Measured in terms of hours, it was
way more than half the work, depending on the ratio of land to livestock.
Within share-cropping and nearly landless families women's economic
power was greater relative to males because the value of their livestock
exceeded that of the land; on marginal and even medium-sized holdings,
planting decisions were often predicated on the importance of sorghum
and alfalfa as fodder. In the most destitute farm families that sharecropped
even their livestock, women usually contracted independently. In all farm
families women managed all the products (grain, milk) as well as most of
the inputs (fodder, fuel, water), which required daily handling, while men
were condemned to seasonal unemployment during fallow and growing
seasons. Whereas entirely female households could survive, it was culturally
inconceivable and physically untenable for men to live 'alone' until markets
began to supply bread, milk, and water.
Most tribeswomen inherited a bit of land, about half as much (under
Islamic laws) as their brothers, but all land in the household was managed
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as a unit by the men (Mundy, 1979). The preferred marriage patterns
kept both people and property within the extended family, or tribal fraction. The ideal household consisted of two or more adult males, one of
whom could be off-farm, and three or four women. Polygamy occurred,
but the extended household of male kin was preferred. When women
married, they looked after their mothers and sisters-in-law, with whom
they would spend their lives dividing day-to-day chores. A brideprice
composed of gold, livestock, or other goods was paid to the bride and her
father. If a man divorced his wife, he regained part of the brideprice but
lost her labour, her land, her livestock, and the alliance of her male kin.
It happened, but was not taken lightly. The other women in the household
and the necessity of her labour minimized wife abuse.
Under tribal law, women were not at all equal to men. They did have
tribal status and membership, but they were also treated as 'protected'
people. Therefore, they would not bear arms, and should never be attacked;
if they were harmed, the blood-money compensation might be as much as
eleven times that of a man's. No tribeswoman should set foot in a marketplace, engage directly in trade, or betray her sexual honour. Tribeswomen
were thus the object of a chauvinistic code of chivalry that denied direct
participation in the military-political sphere or in the market.
Women from shaykhly, qadi, and administrative families exercised a
certain power as intermediaries and as consummators of political alliances.
Except under very dire circumstances when a distraught widow burst into
a shaykh's diwan, women approached political leaders through their menfolk or the shaykh's womenfolk. Women in political families often married
into potentially allied tribes, where they enjoyed membership in their
fathers' as well as protection by their husband's tribe. Depending on her
temperament, relationship with her family, and the specific circumstances,
such a marriage could be an entre into influential behind-the-scenes politics
or into social and psychological exile.
Although the daughters and wives of tribal chiefs shared with sayyid
women the potential for political marriages, there was a clear difference
between the 'ladies' of the upper crust and tribeswomen. For the women
of the religious aristocracy exemplified the seclusion and modesty of Muslim
wives, mothers, and daughters. The privileged 'ladies' of the 'best families'
were also the most 'protected' group in society: from work, from public
view and interaction with strangers, and from violence. Daughters of sayyid
families, who always married other sa'ada, veiled heavily after the fashion
of Ottoman Turks who partly conquered Yemen in the seventeenth and
again in the nineteenth century. In centres of administration and learning
in the highlands, post-pubescent females lived a cloistered existence, venturing from their homes only to visit other women, cloaked from head to
foot in yards of fabric, while in elite Tihama towns a labyrinth of passages
allowed them to visit without entering the street. The veil symbolized not
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just honour but freedom from the drudgery and physical exertion of the
fields. Unlike rural tribeswomen familiar with all the men in their own
communities, the ladies of the well-born and learned families refrained
from contact with males beyond their immediate families, and were therefore far more likely to. marry utter strangers. Their extreme modesty were
marks of privilege, mimicked by women of qadi families that could afford
it.
The veiled ladies enjoyed a further privilege open to no other women:
schooling. Within sayyid and qadi families literate women trained their
brightest daughters and nieces to read the Quran, practice calligraphy, or,
sometimes, in herbology or other arts. For the apt pupils in the best urban
families tutors might be brought. Such learning conferred tremendous
prestige because it was so rare.
In other ways the women of all but the royal family shared certain
things in common. Although sayyid families were more likely to have a
public fountain, often endowed through a pious foundation (waqf), near
their homes, they still had to haul water. Although they might take in poor
relatives, orphans, or women of 'service' strata to lighten the load, unlike
the ladies of Europe they did not rely on servants to prepare meals, keep
house, or raise children. Their neighbours were frequently of different
status. And like women throughout Yemen they tended cows and goats
for milk and breeding, typically feeding them with alfalfa and other crops
from nearby waqf gardens. And it must be noted that the men and women
sharecroppers on the waqf gardens chequering sayyid communities were
not infrequently themselves sayyids whose association with the pious foundation or a mosque conferred prestige on tasks otherwise performed by
the untitled lower strata. Other sayyidat earned money, grain, or goods by
reading or performing at feminine celebrations, healing, tutoring, and so
forth.
Finally, the untitled muzayyin and Akhdam women were the least constrained and least privileged: having neither land nor status, they had only
their labour to barter or sell and (as the others saw it) no particular honour to protect. Yet within their families low-status women wielded more
economic power than their ladylike or even tribal sisters. Although a complete ethnography of the trades has not been done, apparently there are
a number of trades where women and men each have special skills (pottery),
some where they do similar tasks (straw weaving, sewing), some where
each gender serves its own (barbering, cosmetics, entertaining), and some
performed only by men (carpentry, metal work, fishing) whose wives tended
livestock or vegetable gardens. For the wholly shameless it was even possible to enter the market, unveiled, to hawk wares, serve in a restaurant,
or tend to traveller's needs at a hostel. Even these market women looked
down on the Akhdam street sweepers.
Polygamy rates seem to have been highest among the most and the least
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privileged families. Among the political elites, men took second and third
wives to cement political alliances and head households in more than one
location. At the other end of the spectrum, peddlers, itinerant traders,
caravaneers, and other travelling men found a wife in each of several
destinations, leaving each to fend for herself much of the time, raising livestock, selling crafts or services, or ingratiating themselves to more affluent
families. The latter-landless wives of shiftless men-enjoyed little honour
or wealth, but (so) they enjoyed more freedom of physical mobility, economic independence, and personal access to shaykhs and judges than any
other women.
The ways in which status distinctions were constituted, reflected, reinforced, or, more recently, modified in the course of daily interaction and
crisis resolution have been a major theme in the ethnographies of Yemeni
men. Social inequalities among men are enacted almost daily in the seating
arrangements at a qat session, where the most prestigious seats are in the
far comer of the diwan or mafraj, opposite the windows, and the least
desirable places are near the door (Dresch, 1985). Forms of greeting and
rhetorical style also mark the status of both the speaker and the person
being addressed (Caton, 1986).
Within the female domain, the cues to status seem far more subtle,
since social interactions coalesced around physical rather than status
proximity. In traditional neighbourhoods and villages, a feminine social
network revolved around water sources and afternoon social gatherings.
At the water-hole or fountain, fights might break out in dry periods but
no one could pull rank. In more urban neighbourhoods where market,
elite, and tribal households often shared common spaces and facilities,
women attending wedding and post-natal parties filled the mafraj two and
three deep, on a first come, first served basis, quite oblivious to status
ranking, and convention required either equal greetings to each individual
or a single collective blessing. While everyone knew who could and could
not marry whom, in women's gatherings only the visiting, special-occasion
professionals, like ritual Quran readers, by definition sayyidat, and
muzzayina entertainers, stood out. Even wealthy, powerful women married to shaykhs, governors, or princes took pains not to show off. Within
the group, women ignored status distinctions, and felt it rude to speak of
them. One's personal honour depended on personal traits like generosity,
piety, wit, and motherhood.

THE IMPACT OF CHANGE ON STATUS

The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was a separate state from 1962, when the
imamate fell, until 1990, when North and South Yemen unified. During
that period, a political, economic, and social transformation unleashed by
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the civil war (1962-70) destroyed not only the imamate but also the
political basis of aristocratic preferences and privileges. The oil bonanza in
the neighbouring Arab Gulf opened up wage and entrepreneurial opportunities for over a million Yemeni sojourners whose remittances, peaking
at over a billion dollars a year, flooded a formerly 'closed' economy of
fewer than ten million residents with hard currency and imported commodities. Within a generation class had substantially replaced status as the
principal denominator of social inequality. In the late 1980s, deflation in
the price of oil reduced the YAR's foreign currency transfers, sending the
economy into recession. In the meantime, however, Sana'a had negotiated
a political agreement for unification with the heretofore Marxist postcolonial regime of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY),
noted, among other things, for its progressive family and gender policies.
Soon on the heels of unification came another major shock from the 1991
Gulf War, which precipitated an influx of returned migrants and sharply
reduced international assistance. These rapid, major changes affected men
and women differently, and among women the effects of rapid modernization and political developments depended on both prior status and
subsequent class position.
In the North Yemeni bourgeois society, with its commercial economy
and bureaucratic state, status inequalities continued to differentiate men
but they lost their material and occupational underpinnings. With political
upheavals and the advent of modem urban education old elites lost their
monopoly over learning and their domination of the expanding apparatus
of the state. Traders as a group and certain importers and money-changers
in particular flourished, and were indeed able to transform new wealth
into prestige and power. Sellers of certainly traditionally valuable and now
widely available commodities like meat and qat now prospered while some
artisan categories like potters and weavers lost most of their trade to cheap
uniform imports. The latter joined the thousands of smallholders and
some tenant sharecroppers in the growing exodus to the Gulf where some
established small businesses but the majority worked for wages. Migrant
remittances entered Yemen via money-changers who transmitted them to
families for expenditure on consumption. This economic 'demand' pulled
markets, roads, electricity, and pumped water into the countryside. Soon,
the market for wage labour spread into the Yemeni towns and eventually
the villages.
With the availability of imported white flour, tinned milk and food, and,
more unevenly, gas, electricity, and piped water, the economic basis of
household grain and livestock production on dry land began to collapse.
Those who could dig or drill wells to irrigate their land for qat or commercial food crops did so, and the qat farmers made a small fortune (Weir,
1985). Others gradually concluded that the old grain and livestock regime
was more trouble than it was worth, and the men moved further into the
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wage economy. By the late 1980s, when the bonanza ended, most families
were almost entirely dependent on the market.
Women's access to the fruits of North Yemeni modernization projects
was uneven, for water, electricity, roads, education, and health-care services distribution was affected by factors ranging from technology and
terrain to politics and foreign aid. The extension of these services affected,
and reflected, urban-rural as well as class and gender differences. Overall,
only a small, privileged proportion of women enjoyed enough access to
education, health services, and transport to really transform their lives, to
support and express themselves individually in the new public spheres of
market and state.
The single most significant change for women came from piped water.
In the two decades after the end of the civil war in 1970, the Yemen Arab
Republic, with international assistance, delivered water to much of the
population: 29 per cent of households, mostly in cities and towns, had
piped water by 1981, and the proportion of households reached may well
have doubled in the next decade with the completion of an additional
1,223 water projects (CPO, 1988: 65, 111). Women who now had water
piped to the house or at least the neighbourhood were freed of one of the
most time-consuming and strenuous of their traditional tasks, the carrying
of water. This was a most welcome relief especially to rural highland women,
many of whom spent hours walking several kilometres a day to provide
their families with a couple of buckets full of water. However, it should also
be noted that the water collection spot previously gave women a gathering
place outside the home, and that going for water afforded a particular sort
of physical mobility and, indeed, exercise, so that household or neighbourhood taps removed their main excuse for leaving the home even as it
relieved them of an arduous task..
The second service gradually reaching most households was electricity,
extended gradually from the cities, along the main roads, into the countryside, reaching 64 per cent of households by 1981 and nearly tripling in
generating capacity by the end of the decade (CPO, 1988: 65, 112-13).
Electric lights and televisions bought with migrants' remittances now lit
most homes. This made a difference in the rhythm of daily life once tied
to sunrise and sunset and in the nature of leisure time once filled only with
social conversation. Women liberated from the task of hauling water, and
in many cases from livestock rearing, now settled in the afternoon or evening in front of the TV to watch Yemeni, Arab, and Western programmes.
Television mesmerized, reducing the incentive to attend women's parties,
and to talk when one did visit. It introduced a partial, rarified glimpse of
lifestyles and technologies never imagined a decade earlier, from Caireen
middle class sitcoms to improbable scenarios with talking, flying, anthropomorphic animations or real men in space flight. This exposure raised
certain expectations but also created confusion and even revulsion about
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the world outside. Electrification also introduced basic appliances like
washing machines, blenders, and refrigerators, whose utilization were less
labour saving than housework modifying. There is little evidence of time
saved fetching water or chopping vegetables being put towards 'economic'
purposes (Myntti, 1979).
Female access to other services was more limited. Roads brought appliances, building materials, and consumer goods, but relatively few women
travelled, and then only heavily veiled. Indeed the arrival of vehicular
traffic brought strangers whose presence made most girls and women
more reluctant to venture from home and more likely to veil. Although in
medical emergencies women might ride to a clinic or hospital, few travelled
by car to clinics or schools on a routine basis.
Although schools and clinics were built throughout North Yemen in the
1970s and 1980s, female access to education and medical care, especially
beyond the main cities, was limited and spotty. Some aggregate statistics
illustrate this point. By 1985, female literacy rates in the YAR were estimated at 3 per cent, compared with 27 per cent for males, and 25 per
cent for females in South Yemen. Between 1986 and 1988, 40 per cent
of primary school-aged girls were enrolled (compared with 141 per cent
for boys, indicating large numbers of older male students). At the secondary
level, the proportion of the female age group dropped to six per cent
(Moghadam, 1992: table 13), reflecting parents' reluctance to send pubescent daughters to school, due to the acute shortage of women teachers,
to fathers' refusal to have their daughters more educated than themselves,
to mothers' desire to have them help at home, and to the widespread
perception that advanced education for girls is 'wasted'. City girls were
going to school at twice the rate of their country cousins. During 19867, girls constituted one-fifth of those in grades one to six, including 42 per
cent in Sana'a and probably the other cities, but a commensurately lower
proportion elsewhere. At the preparatory and secondary levels females
were only 11 per cent of pupils, and 19-20 per cent in Sana'a city alone
(CPO, 1987: 157-62). There was a comparable urban bias in female
education in the PDRY, where two-thirds of Adeni girls but around onethird elsewhere attended primary school, and at the secondary level 43 per
cent of teenage females in Aden were students, but in other govemorates
the figures mirrored the YAR's (Al-Noban, 1984: 121). The ratio of female to male enrollment in all of Yemen in the mid-1980s was 24 at the
primary level, 22 at the secondary level, and 40 for higher education
(Khalidi and Tucker, n.d., p. 5).
The rate of college entry of female graduates of YAR secondary schools
being equal to men's, women represented 12 per cent of Yemeni student
body at Sana'a University, and of various faculties as follows: medicine,
56 per cent; arts, 31 per cent; science, 24 per cent; education, 21 per cent;
commerce and economics, 9 per cent; engineering, 7 per cent; law, 2 per
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cent; agriculture, 2 per cent. At the Taiz faculty of education, 31 per cent
of the Yemeni students were women (CPO, 1987: 177). Fourteen per
cent of YAR graduate students, and a quarter of trainees at teachers'
institutes were women (CPO, 1987: 169). In comparison, women were in
the absolute numerical majority at Aden University of South Yemen,
where they represented 72 per cent of students in the college of education
and half of medical students (Lackner, 1985: 114).
Indicators of health care, like school attendance, put North Yemeni
females behind women in almost all other Middle Eastern countries. In
1981-5 the contraceptive prevalence rate of 1 per cent was the lowest in
the Middle East, and the fertility rate of 8.5 per cent was the highest. A
World Fertility Survey in the early eighties reported that only a quarter of
Yemeni women were aware of family planning methods, again far lower
than elsewhere even within the Arab World, and less than 5 per cent were
reportedly willing to use contraceptives, perhaps because child mortality
under age one remained an alarming 162 per thousand, and 237 under
the age of five (Moghadam, 1992, table 12). Acceptance of contraception
(and/or the results of surveys) varied regionally, however, as a 1977 survey
in Sana'a found that 21 per cent of women had used contraceptives and
37 said they might in the future, whereas the Family Planning Association
reported that 13 per cent were using contraceptives and in another, rural,
survey, Myntti found that 9 per cent of ever-married women practised
family planning (Myntti, 1985: 50). In 1985, according to World Health
Organization estimates, 12 per cent of births were attended by a recognized professional attendant, and maternal mortality could not even be
estimated (World Bank, 1989: 226).
One profound difficulty with first-generation access to either education
or medical care, despite the fact that access was theoretically free and
universal, was the acute shortage of female teachers, nurses, and doctors.
Indeed, during the 1970s and 1980s most teaching and health practitioner
positions were filled by Egyptian, Sudanese, or Palestinian professionals,
predominantly male. Only 13 per cent of primary teachers, 5 per cent of
preparatory teachers, and 4 per cent of secondary teachers in 1981-2 were
Yemeni (CPO, 1983: 220). By 1986, half of all physicians, one-third of
qualified nurses, one-quarter of midwives, but 98 per cent of assistant
nurses were Yemeni (CPO, 1987: 230-9). The likelihood of exposure to
a foreign man exacerbated cultural inhibitions against Yemeni women's
secondary school attendance and, particularly, physician care, thereby
restricting access to schools and clinics to a predominantly urban, educated,
wealthy segment of female society.
During this process, women were becoming housewives, professionals,
workers, or farmers. First the housewives. Freed of the back-breaking
daily drudgery of hauling water and firewood, hundreds of thousands of
women discovered leisure for the first time. During the 1970s, as their
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husbands' and sons' jobs or businesses afforded more and more purchases,
women gradually abandoned field chores and then, a bit more reluctantly,
cows and goats. These changes afforded them a kind of pampered luxury
unimagined by their mothers, and an opportunity to imitate the sayyid
ladies of a bygone era by veiling and going into seclusion. With urbanization, as more families moved to larger cities, villages became towns, and
streets became filled with strangers, everybody but the Akhdam and the
Western-educated adopted the formerly aristocratic full black sharshif. Yet
women exchanged symbolic prestige and freedom from hard physical
labour for a considerable loss of economic autonomy. As men's earnings
from the cash economy replaced an interdependent production unit,
women's work became tedious housework with marginalized economic
value: cooking, cleaning, laundry. Their only productive activity is now
child-bearing. Since they are now dependent on their husbands' disposition
as never before, those in nuclear households in new suburban neighbourhoods removed from old feminine networks, particularly, are subject to
unprecedented physical and emotional abuse.
Some combination of education, personal drive, family wealth, and
parental support has propelled about two thousand female members of the
Yemeni bourgeoisie into careers in broadcasting, education, medicine,
public service, and other fields. Not more than a handful run their own
businesses. College educated in Sana'a, Aden, or abroad, they dress stylishly
but modestly. Although of course there may be conflicts within marriages,
their families are prepared to cope with the potential breach of 'honour'
associated with open professionalism: wealthy merchants, muzayyin officers,
educated sayyid and qadi families, and modernizing republican shaykhs.
And they earn prestige on their own in the public sphere. Even so, career
women must juggle multiple family and professional responsibilities (El
Duais, 1991).
The new female urban wage earners, numbering perhaps in the tens of
thousands, include civil servants, unskilled industrial workers, and maids,
probably in that order. Clerks and secretaries are literate and thus privileged
relative to manual workers. Urban factory and household workers, among
them Vietnamese- and African-Yemenis ('half-breeds') as well as some
muzayyin, tribal, and even sayyid women, divorced, widowed, or married
working mothers or unmarried daughters, typically aspire to be housewives.
Often working women must keep their daughters out of school to help out
at home or with piece work. They are at the bottom of every pay scale,
and suffer from loss of prestige, but cannot afford not to work. Their veils
are not a mark of luxury but a way of retaining anonymity and dignity on
public transportation and among strange men in offices, factories, and
shops.
Other women though not formally employed earn a living in the informal
sector, displaying their own bread, eggs, baskets, or needlework in the
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market, or selling clothing and other items at women's parties. Certain
weekly markets including Suq at-Talh near the Saudi border, Suq Bayt
al-Faqih and others in the Tihama, and Taiz markets frequented by Jabal
Sabr women are notable for their women traders, but these are the exception rather than the rule. Elsewhere food, retail, and craft operations are
managed by couples or families, or, more exceptionally, by women through
their children and younger brothers. Male service workers, servants, petty
traders, and sharecroppers also engage their wives and daughters for tasks
that can be done in relative privacy.
In the farm sector, women remain active mainly within the use-oriented
system of cereal and dairy production, for virtually all market and cash
cropping activities, including qat, are designated as men's work. Although
women and girls are sometimes hired as day-labour to harvest cotton,
tomatoes, or other annual crops, at a wage about two-thirds of that of
unskilled men, and although there is evidence that a growing proportion
of sharecropping is done by females, and some fresh kitchen products like
butter, eggs, and yoghurt had excellent market value, the introduction of
mechanical irrigation, tractors, chemical fertilizers, and production-forthe-market put more and more capital and responsibility in the hands of
men. In other words, on functioning integrated farms feeding cattle, goats,
sheep, and chickens from the fields women play a role at least as vital as
before massive male migration. But increasingly commercial-scale egg,
meat, and dairy production and mono-cropping farm enterprises owned
by male merchants and politicians replace domestic production.
There are now very clear class differences between a small number of
families with property or rents that guarantee a high level of consumption
and hired help from drivers, door-keepers, and maids, and larger, increasing
numbers of households whose earnings fluctuate seasonally, monthly, or
even daily to the point of uncertainty about basics like food and housing.
Depending on life-cycle, personal, and family circumstances, bourgeois
women, with access to all services and rights, may be professionals or housewives, and those without guaranteed income and probably illiterate may
be poor housewives or working women. Unlike in the old days, in urban
areas the two groups do not socialize, for their lifestyles are too different.
Although there is much less field evidence, it would seem that some of
the same processes had occurred in South Yemen almost a generation
earlier, when services in and around Aden created a lifestyle very different
from distant Wadi Hadramawt and Mahrah mountain, and the entrepot
economy created class differences sharp enough to spark a revolution. Although politically repressive in some other ways, the Aden regime purported
to treat men and women equally. The PDRY not only recognized women
as full citizens in the constitution, but also made an effort to equalize
access to education, employment, and the professions (Molyneux, 1985).
Although this theoretical goal was never achieved, female participation in
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government and the professions compared favourably not only to other
Arab states but to many Western systems as well. Like many socialist
policies of the PDRY, however, the impact of progressive gender policies
was felt mainly by the 42 per cent of the population living in Aden. As in
the North, poor rural women fell behind just by staying where they were.
Politics was relevant to North Yemeni women's participation in modem
services and employment in a complex way. YAR law was relatively liberal
in terms of post-natal and family-leave-with-pay policies, women's suffrage,
and property rights. Women's suffrage was theoretical because elections
were in any case rare and female participation as either voters or candidates was low; but within the Arabian peninsula, Yemeni women had more
political rights than most. Although seclusion was preferred in practice,
women were not prohibited by law from participating in public life as in
neighbouring countries.
Yet family and gender policies were very much at issue. Feminine
modesty, education, and rights were politicized partly by the YAR's relationship with its two immediate neighbours, Saudi Arabia and the People's
Republic, with drastically opposed gender policies. These positions were
represented politically by the opposition Islamic and National 'fronts',
respectively, since parties were outlawed. During the period between the
early 1970s and the late 1980s, when Saudi influence was at its zenith and
cold-war tensions flared between the YAR and the PDRY, the two neighbours offered very conflicting models for gender roles. While the YAR
rejected some reactionary Saudi restrictions on the rights, appearance, and
activities of women, the Kingdom's wealth gave it tremendous influence
in policy areas including education. Bankrolling salaries for non-Yemeni
Arab teachers, Riyadh recruited religious conservatives who supported
its preference for gender segregation and women's seclusion. Religious
partisans established a large base among faculty and students at Sana'a
University where, in several ugly incidents, bare-headed Arab or Yemeni
women were humiliated or even pelted with stones. The Islamic front also
had a following of genuinely pious men and women attracted by their religious message, were capable of making temporary regional alliances with
Rashid and Bakil, and could sometimes count on the support of Aden
emigres and anti-communist merchants.
By contrast, the progressive gender policies of South Yemen were
admired by opponents of royalist influences in the YAR, by some Shafa'i
communities with familial, tribal, and political ties to Aden and the
Hadramawt, by whole southern uplands and Tihama districts full of sharecroppers wanting social and particularly land reform, and by some secular
lawyers, journalists, professors, and students. Here the political conundrum
was particularly complex, for the radical, unificationist National Democratic Front, which won popular backing in a number of southern uplands
districts around lbb and Taiz, was defeated militarily in the early 1980s,
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and seemingly discredited politically by the terrible, destructive intra-party
blood-bath in Aden in January 1986. During 1986 some ten thousand of
the PDRY's inteliectual, political, and economic elite moved to the North.
In Taiz and Sana'a, the Adeni women, wearing the abayya, a loose cloak
which, though acceptably Islamic was none the less considerably less restrictive than the Northern sharshif, were socially visible, shopping in urban
markets, applying for jobs, visiting with their husbands' friends. While
some conservatives murmured that their behaviour was disgraceful, a lot
of people found an increasingly acceptable model of the modem Muslim
woman.
The historical confluence of Yemeni unity and the Gulf War transformed the political landscape within which gender relations were constructed. Unity heralded new political liberty for Yemenis, northern and
southern, men and women-the new constitution defined citizenship in
gender-neutral terms and guaranteed freedom of the press, of assembly, of
expression, of political organization and participation, from arbitrary arrest,
and from 'discrimination ... due to sex, colour, racial origin, language,
occupation, social status, or religious beliefs' (Article 27, p. 9). Yet within
months of this historic juncture in Yemeni history came the Gulf War, in
which the new republic, trying to remain neutral, was perceived as tilting
towards Iraq, and was consequently punished by Saudi Arabia with a
cancellation of its substantial foreign assistance budget and expulsion of
three quarters of a million Yemenis living in the Kingdom.
The gender effects of these events were far-reaching. First, the aid cutoff meant that foreign educators, health practitioners, and other professionals working in the North would no longer be paid in hard currency.
They left in droves, opening up thousands of positions to be filled by
Adeni teachers, nurses, and clerks, including many more women than had
ever been employed in North Yemen. As part of the anti-Saudi sentiment
in the immediate aftermath of the expulsions, at least a few women were
thrust to the political forefront, for instance addressing crowds of tens of
thousands who gathered in public squares to protest the war. Gender and
family statements were also at issue in the constitutional referendum of
May 1991, when a coalition of Hashid and Islamic leaders unsuccessfully
called for a boycott of the constitutional referendum unless Sharia were
made the sole basis of law.
Yet the post-war economic crisis also created widespread unemployment
and inflation as the nascent republic struggled to cope with resettlement
and soaring budgetary deficits even as it forged a brand new political
order. With domestic politics on the verge of chaos and Saudi money now
funding rightist, tribal-separatist, and religious factions at unprecedented
levels, politics became increasingly polarized. Appeals to family and religious
values resonate among returned migrants and other disenfranchized groups.
In this context, the role of women, laden with cultural, religious, economic,
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and political implications, is of tremendous ideological and symbolic importance, and has become a front-line political issue.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate that one cannot easily generalize
about the role of Yemeni women, either by bemoaning oppression or by
apologizing for 'chivalry'. Traditional roles varied according to family status,
and women's status in the home and in society is nowadays affected by
class. One irony that emerges from studying gender relations in Yemen is
that the relative autonomy, participation, and self-reliance valued by
Western feminists attaches to economic necessity and low prestige in the
South Arabian context, where (non-professional) working women tend to
envy housewives. Conversely, greater leisure for housewives is accompanied by a reduced economic role and eroding sense of feminine solidarity.
Only at a high level of comfort and education do women begin to consider
'careers'. The larger point I have tried to make is that while cultural
artefacts like the veil loom large in the eyes of foreigners, within a cultural
setting economic and material conditions on the one hand and national
and international political circumstances on the other mould gender relations in ways that have direct impact on women's lives. Sayyid, tribal, and
partisan interpretations of 'family values' exist and are emphasized politically
in time of economic or political crisis. I would argue that it is not Islamic,
Arab, or tribal culture per se but rather their relationship to the political
economy within which they operate that restricts or liberates women. In
the same way that Pearson, in this volume, argues that industrialization
does not have a uniform impact on women, likewise, I maintain that
'modernization' does not have a unilinear, universal, or automatic impact on
gender relations. Women's roles and rights depend rather on more specific
features of status, class, and the politics and economics of development.
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